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Horseplay by Employees
Michael Kaye*
T E TREND OF AUTHORITY is strongly in favor of eliminating
the aggressor defense from Workmen's Compensation law.1
The instigator, like the victim or participant in horseplay, is
now likely to be compensated for his injuries resulting from
sportive acts. This is looked on by the law as a reasonable con-
sequence of the natural conditions of employment rather than
as a deviation.2 "Horseplay" is the colloquial term referring to
sportive and playful acts often used legalistically to describe
the conduct of employees who skylark or prank, doing injury to
themselves or to others. 3 Sportive conduct includes assaults with
or without an instrumentality furnished by the employer, 4 dur-
* A.B., Western Reserve University; Fourth-year Student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 McCoy v. Easley Cotton Mills, 218 S. C. 350, 62 S. E. 2d 772 (1950); Joe
N. Miles and Sons v. Myatt, 215 Miss. 589, 61 So. 2d.390 (1952); Newell v.
Moreau, 94 N. H. 439, 55 A. 2d 476 (1947); Martin v. Snuffey's Steakhouse,
46 N. J. S. 425, 134 A. 2d 789 (1957); Verschleiser v. Joseph Stern Son, Inc.,
229 N. Y. 192, 128 N. E. 126 (1920); Petro v. Martin Baking Co., 239 Minn.
307, 58 N. W. 2d 731 (1953); Ransom v. H. G. Hill Co., 205 Tenn. 377, 326
S. W. 2d 659 (1959); Malthais v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 93 N. H. 237, 40
A. 2d 837 (1944); Swift and Co. v. Industrial Comm., 287 Ill. 564, 122 N. E.
796 (1919); Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry, 198 N. C. 723, 153 S. E. 266
(1930); Southern Cotton Oil Division v. Minnie Lee Childress, 237 Ark.
909, 377 S. W. 2d 167 (1964); Montpetit v. Standard Shade Roller Corp.,
100 N. Y. S. 2d 640 (App. Div. 1950); Sinko v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 104 Pa.
Super. 357, 159 A. 230 (1932); Piatek v. Plymouth Rock Provision Co., 15
App. Div. 2d 405, 224 N. Y. S. 2d 634 (1962).
2 Secor v. Penn Service Garage, 19 N. J. 315, 117 A. 2d 12 (1955); East Ohio
Gas Co. v. Coe, 42 Ohio App. 334, 182 N. E. 123 (1932); Crilly v. Ballou, 353
Mich. 303, 91 N. W. 2d 493 (1958); Piatek v. Plymouth Rock Provision,
supra n. 1.
3 Hazelwood v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 208 Ky. 618, 271 S. W. 687
(1925); Blaine v. Huttig Sash and Door Co., 232 Mo. App. 870, 105 S. W.
689 (1926); Hughes v. Tapley, 200 Ark. 739, 177 S. W. 2d 429 (1944); McCoy
v. Easley Cotton Mills, supra n. 1; J. C. Hamilton Co. v. Bickel, 174 Okla.
32, 49 P. 2d 1065 (1935); Michaux v. Gate City Orange Crush Bottling Co.,
205 N. C. 786, 122 S. E. 406 (1934); Cassel v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 115 Tex. 371, 283 S. W. 127 (1926); Staten v. Long-Turner
Construction Co., 185 S. W. 2d 375 (Mo. App. 1945); Tyler-Couch Construc-
tion Co. v. Elmore, 264 S. W. 2d 56 (Ky. 1954); Leonbruno v. Champlain
Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920).
4 Ford v. United Fruit Co., 171 F. 2d 641 (9th Cir. 1948); United States
Casualty Co. v. Hampton, 293 S. W. 260 (Tex. 1927); Chambers v. Union Oil
Co., 199 N. C. 28, 153 S. E. 594 (1930); Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Burns,
290 S. W. 2d 836 (Ky. 1956); Allsep v. Daniel Construction Co., 216 S. C.
268, 57 S. E. 2d 427 (1950); Southern Cotton Oil Division v. Minnie Lee
Childress, supra n. 1; Diaz v. Newark Industrial Spraying, Inc., 60 N. J. S.
(Continued on next page)
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ing actual working hours or in periods of enforced idleness,5 be-
fore or after the close of the working day.6
The current position of the courts in deciding cases of horse-
play reveals an increased understanding of the meaning of
Workmen's Compensation statutes as social legislation creating
new substantive rights and not merely affording new remedial
rights for old substantive rights. 7 In Crilly v. Ballou8 a teenage
claimant who had lost an eye through his horseplay while at
work on a roofing and siding job was compensated. In observ-
ing that Workmen's Compensation rests on the idea of status,
not implied contract, and in noting that the consuming public,
not charity, must foot the bill for injuries incurred in industry,
the court did not bar recovery because of the "mere human fail-
ings of the workmen." The court rejected the defense that the
injury was not in the scope of employmentY Course of employ-
ment describes life in the industrial age and involves the con-
ditions and relationships which produce a product. This in-
cludes the effect of the environment on the employee.10
In the case of Malthais v. Equitable Life Assurance Soci-
ety," the claimant of a decedent who, in initiating horseplay
with an airhose, caused his own death, received an award be-
cause death was held to be the result of a risk incident to the
conditions of employment. Instigation of horseplay was not such
serious misconduct as to take it out of the statute.
The "in-the-course" approach was adopted in the recent
Tennessee case of Ransom v. H. G. Hill Company.12 The instiga-
tor of horseplay recovered, as his act was held to be an insub-
stantial deviation and the result of conditions of environment.
Conditions of employment which induce horseplay are not lim-
(Continued from preceding page)
424, 159 A. 2d 462 (1960); Markell v. Daniel Green Felt Shoe Co., 161
N. Y. S. 1134, 116 N. E. 1060 (1917); Piatek v. Plymouth Rock Provision Co.,
supra n. 1.
5 Stockham Pipe Fitting Co. v. Williams, 245 Ala. 570, 18 So. 2d 93 (1943);
Johnson v. Loew's, Inc., 180 N. Y. S. 2d 826 (App. Div. 1958).
6 Johnson v. Loew's, Inc., supra n. 5.
7 Childstrom v. Trojan Seed Co., 242 Minn. 471, 65 N. W. 2d 888 (1954).
8 Supra n. 2.
9 Crilly v. Ballou, supra n. 2, at p. 497.
10 Id., at p. 505.
11 Supra n. 1.
12 Ibid.
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ited to the pressures of a mill or factory grind. Enforced idle-
ness may provoke horseplay, as in the 1960 case of Johnson v.
Loew's,13 where the instigator recovered on the ground that mo-
mentary indulgence in some diversion may be expected of em-
ployees. In the Diaz case 14 horseplay was viewed as a reason-
able human reaction to working conditions, occurring during
a minor deviation from the employment and therefore work con-
nected. This is different from wilful or malicious assault, which
would not be compensable. 5 The Diaz case requires a realistic
view of reasonable human reactions to working conditions and
people encountered in the course of employment. 1
6
The case for compensation is even stronger where the risk
of injury from horseplay is increased because of the nature of
the work and materials being used.'1  Horseplay need not be
limited to acts in conjunction with others, but can describe mo-
mentary and impulsive acts of the individual alone.' The trend
to allow recovery for these minor acts of deviation indicates
judicial interest in the consequences rather than in the exact
nature of the horseplay act.' 9 Where the consequence was not
intended, the claimant should recover. 20
The test of relation to the employment was cited in the case
of Burns v. Merritt Engineering Co.,21 where an employee, hav-
ing been induced to violate a company rule against drinking,
drank a chemical resembling liquor, and was thereby injured.
Victimization by a prank was held to be recognized as a peril of
service although success of the prank depended on the victim's
13 Supra n. 5.
14 Supra n. 4.
15 Secor v. Penn Service Garage, supra n. 2; Knickerbocker, Torts: Work-
men's Compensation: Arising out of employment: Horseplay, 34 Cornell
L. Q. 460 (1949); Cunning v. City of Hopkins, 258 Minn. 306, 103 N. W. 2d
876 (1960).
16 29 NACCA L. J. 239 (1962).
17 Ibid.; Socha v. Cudahy Packing Co., 105 Neb. 691, 181 N. W. 706 (1921);
Johnson v. Loew's, Inc., supra n. 5; Piatek v. Plymouth Rock Provision Co.,
supra n. 1, at p. 636.
18 Shapaka v. State Compensation Comm'r., 146 W. Va. 319, 119 S. E. 2d 821
(1961); Boyd v. Florida Mattress Factory, Inc., 128 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1961);
Secor v. The Penn Service Garage, supra n. 2; Pederson v. Nelson, 45
N. Y. S. 2d 784 (App. Div. 1944).
19 16 NACCA L. J. 116 (1958).
20 Ibid.
21 Burns v. Merritt Engineering Co., 302 N. Y. 131, 90 N. E. 2d 739 (1951).
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willingness to break a hard and fast rule.22 Relation to the em-
ployment replaced the older test of foreseeability.
The pre-requisite of employer knowledge has been consider-
ably weakened. 23 As in previous cases cited, a participant in
horseplay was compensated despite the fact that the employer
had no knowledge of the incident.2 4 The Boyd case 25 also re-
fused to inject foreseeability into a non-fault.
The Burns case established as the sole criteria for compen-
sation that the injury arise out of and in the course of employ-
ment. "Arising out of" refers to the origin and cause of the in-
jury, and "in the cause of" refers to the time, place and circum-
stances under which the injury occurred. 26
Course of employment is limited by the employee's devia-
tion; if the deviation is so extreme in time or place as to con-
stitute an abandonment, the injury will not be compensated. 27
The fact, however, that an injury is coincidental or contem-
poraneous to employment is not alone a sufficient basis for an
award.28 Acts of the employer may be a deciding factor as well
as acts of the employee. For example, in the Hayes case29 the
court, in 1956, held that an injury due to horseplay would be
compensable if the employer knew and acquiesced in the con-
duct which resulted in the injury. The crucial test under the
"arising out of" doctrine is whether the causal effect of the
environment is nullified by influences originating outside the
working environment8 0 Although unforeseen, an injury arises
out of the employment if it is a natural or reasonable incident
22 Ibid.
23 Gregory v. Lewis Sales Co. and Travelers Insurance Co., 348 S. W. 2d
743 (Mo. App. 1961); Piatek v. Plymouth Rock Provision Co., supra n. 1.
24 Ognibene v. Rochester Mfg. Co., 298 N. Y. 85, 80 N. E. 2d 749 (1948) (dis-
senting opinion); Boyd v. Florida Mattress Factory, Inc., supra n. 18; Diaz
v. Newark Industrial Spraying, Inc., supra n. 4; Contra, Greene v. Watson's
Flagg Machine Co., 25 N. J. Misc. 146, 51 A. 2d 121 (Dep't. of Labor, Work-
men's Compensation Bureau, 1947); Industrial Comm'r v. McCarthy, 295
N. Y. 443, 68 N. E. 2d 434 (1946); Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Burns, supra
n. 4; Hazelwood v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., supra n. 3; Johnson v.
Loew's, Inc., supra n. 5; Piatek v. Plymouth Rock Provision Co., supra n. 1.
25 Boyd v. Florida Mattress Factory, Inc., supra n. 18.
26 Supra, n. 21; and, Louisville & Jefferson County Air Board v. Riddle, 301
Ky. 100, 190 S. W. 2d 1009 (1945).
27 26-27 NACCA L. J. 248, 252 (1960-1961); Secor v. Penn Service Garage,
supra n. 2.
28 Fazio v. Cardillo, 109 F. 2d 835, 836 (D. C. Cir. 1940).
29 Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Burns, supra n. 4.
30 Foster v. Aines Dairy Farm Co., 263 S. W. 2d 421, 429 (Mo. 1953).
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of the employment.3 ' The vital question becomes: "Was the
injury caused by a work-induced assault?" 32 If the reasonable
man can see a connection between the working environment and
the resulting injury, the assault arises out of employment and is
compensable. 33 The causal connection is sufficiently demon-
strated when the work places the instrumentability in the hands
of an employee,3 4 or through judicial notice of the risks of close
association as including the risk of pranks.3 5
Most significant of the broadened approach of horseplay
cases is the trend toward eliminating the aggressor defense.
Under the aggressor defense prevailing in a diminishing number
of jurisdictions,36 fault concepts sometimes find their way into
the compensation statutes. New York courts have allowed re-
covery only where the horseplay has become a regular incident
of employment, and the employer has actual or constructive no-
tice.3 7 There is, however, recent authority to the effect that such
knowledge is no longer a prerequisite.38 Another approach
lumps assault and horseplay together, raising the question
whether or not the nature and conditions of the employment
caused the act to occur.39 Larson has viewed the aggressor cases
as an in-the-course problem distinguishable from assault cases,
the question being, was there substantial deviation from the
course of employment?4 0
31 Malthais v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, supra n. 1.
32 Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay under Workmen's Compensation Laws,
41 Ill. L. Rev. 311, 331 (1946).
33 Id. at 334; York v. City of Hazard, 301 Ky. 306, 191 S. W. 2d 239, 241
(1945); Ashley v. F-W Chevrolet Co., 222 N. C. 25, 21 S. E. 2d 834 (1942);
Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N. E. 2d 328 (1940); Hanson v. Robitshek-
Schneider Co., 209 Minn. 596, 297 N. W. 19 (1941).
34 Citations in note 17, supra.
35 Diaz v. Newark Industrial Spraying, Inc., supra n. 4; Penzara v. Maffia
Bros., 307 N. Y. 15, 119 N. E. 2d 570 (1954) (dissenting opinion); Southern
Cotton Oil Div. v. Minnie Lee Childress, supra n. 1; North End Foundry
Co. v. Industrial Comm'r, 251 Wis. 332, 29 N. W. 2d 40 (1947).
36 Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Division of Industrial Accidents & Safety,
209 Cal. 656, 289 P. 619 (1930), overruled on another point (California com-
pensates only the innocent victim).
37 Industrial Comm'r v. McCarthy, supra n. 24; Lang v. Franklin Ry. Sup-
ply Co., 272 App. Div. 988, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 1 (1947), motion for leave to ap-
peal denied, 297 N. Y. 1036, 77 N. E. 2d 524 (1948); Paderson v. Nelson,
supra n. 18; Ognibene v. Rochester Mfg. Co., supra n. 24.
38 Piatek v. Plymouth Rock Provision Co., supra n. 1.
39 26-27 NACCA L. J. 248 (1960-1961).
40 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 23.60 (1965).
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The trend toward including the horseplay aggressor has
been influenced by assault cases. The leading case of Cunning
v. City of Hopkins41 awarded compensation to an employee on
the basis of the earlier assault case of Petro v. Martin Baking
Co.42 In the Petro case the court refused to deny recovery to
the claimant of an employee killed in a work connected quarrel,
despite the fact that he was the aggressor. The injuries were
held to have arisen from the employment because the dispute
stemmed from the environment and its associations.43 Recog-
nizing that the Petro decision had eliminated aggression in as-
sault cases, the Cunning case declared that an employee's fail-
ure to realize the consequences of his foolish acts should not bar
recovery,44 and compensated a college student who injured him-
self while playfully obstructing the vision of the driver of a
truck in which he was riding. The court declared that the injury
arose out of the employment since transportation was furnished
by the employer as an incident of the employment. The horse-
play did not amount to wilful misconduct and emphasis was laid
not on who initiated the incident but whether the nature of the
incident was such that it arose out of the employment. 45
Reinterpretation of the words "arising out of" and a more
reasonable attempt at understanding human behavior have, it
appears, led to the downfall of the aggressor-defense doctrine.
To say that an accident arose out of the employment is to say
that the work required the employee's presence at the point of
peril, that the work placed him in a position of danger.46
It should not matter if that precise danger was foreseeable
or peculiar to the particular situation.47 It would appear, how-
ever, that cases such as Cunning, while ostensibly based on the
"arising out of employment" theory, are in fact using the course
of employment tool. This ambiguous application of concepts may
become the Pandora's box of hairline distinctions and exceptions
that have plagued the compensation of participant and aggressor
in horseplay compensation cases since the early decision of Leon-
41 Supra n. 15.
42 Supra n. 1.
43 Ibid.
44 Cunning v. City of Hopkins, supra n. 15.
45 Ibid.
46 5 NACCA L. J. 60 (1950).
47 Ibid.
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bruno v. Champlain Silk Mills.48  Under the "arising out of"
concept the working environment need not be the proximate
cause of the injury, but may be only qne of many causes.49
Literal minded judges may mistake the letter of the law for its
spirit. An example of such a decision is Whitehouse v. R. R.
Dawson Bridge Co.50 in which the decedent's claimant was de-
nied compensation on the grounds of substantial deviation. At
the worksite, but having no duties to perform, the decedent
jumped into a stream to ride a log, and drowned. The court de-
nied recovery because no duties of employment were involved.51
But was it not the employment that had brought Whitehouse to
the point of peril? The injury undoubtedly arose at the time,
place, and circumstances of the employment.
Wilful assaults and criminal conduct are held not to arise
out of employment. 52 Where horseplay ends in wilful assault, is
injury or death compensable as horseplay or non-compensable
as wilful assault? 53 Where an employee left a cafeteria, in which
he worked, to engage (as a result of a personal quarrel engen-
dered by horseplay) in a fight in the lavatory with a boy work-
ing there, the court held that the injury did not arise out of the
employment. The court recognized that the incident grew out of
horseplay, but failed to see any causal connection to the employ-
ment.54 Where the employee at the moment of injury was not
engaged in the duties of his employment, it has been held that
the injury did not arise out of the employment. 55 This is con-
sistent with the aggressor doctrine policy of subjectively com-
pensating the victim and non-participant in horseplay, and deny-
ing the instigator who turned from his work to frolic.
In Favre v. Werk Press Cloth Mfg. Co., Inc.56 the claimant
48 Supra n. 3
49 Gregory v. Lewis Sales Co., 348 S. W. 2d 743, 746 (Mo. App. 1961).
50 382 S. W. 2d 77 (Ky. 1964).
51 Ibid.
52 Long v. Schultz Shoe Co., 257 S. W. 2d 211, 213 (Mo. App. 1953).
53 Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Pittman, 214 Miss. 823, 59 So.
2d 547, 548 (1952) (Where horseplay ended in wilful assault, the court found
a reasonable relation to the employment).
54 Fazio v. Cardillo, supra n. 28.
55 Stockham Pipe Fittings Co. v. Williams, 245 Ala. 570, 18 So. 2d 93 (1943);
Borden v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 187 Minn. 600, 246 N. W. 254 (1953);
Ognibene v. Rochester Mfg. Co., supra n. 24 (Claimant required to be en-
gaged in his work for compensation).
56 152 So. 694 (La. App. 1934).
Jan., 1966
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was an innocent victim of the horseplay of other employees. He
was compensated in that his injury arose out of the employment,
the necessity of association with co-workers due to the employ-
ment providing the necessary causal connection. The court laid
down tests for determining whether the injury arose out of the
employment: (1) whether or not the employee was engaged in
the employer's business at the time; (2) whether the necessities
of the employer's business required the employee to be at the
place at the time of injury. (The court in a dictum stated that
the fact that the injury might have occurred had the employee
gone to the same place for his own purposes was immaterial.57)
These tests relate more to time and place-to course of employ-
ment-than to causation.
By relying on the course of employment criterion rather
than that of "arising out of," the test of compensability will be
substantial deviation in time and place rather than the vagaries
of causal connection. This will be more compatible with the doc-
trine of horseplay which, since the Leonbruno case, by definition
arises out of the conditions of employment. Since horseplay is
a form of assault but not a wilful assault, there is no need to
scrutinize the facts to find whether it arose out of the employ-
ment. The court need only consider whether the act of horse-
play was more than an impulse, a momentary and inconsequen-
tial deviation from the course of employment.
The modern view of horseplay exhibits an increasing tend-
ency to treat victims, participants, and instigators of horseplay
as equally compensable. These cases tend to reject common law
reasoning of foreseeability and fault, and award recovery where
the injury arises out of the course of employment, irrespective
of fault. In New Jersey, the harshest view which previously de-
nied compensation in all horseplay cases 5s has, in the Diaz59 and
Secor 0 cases, shown strong signs of recognizing horseplay as a
fact of employment. The New York view also has disengaged
itself from requiring outmoded common law tests such as custom
57 Id. at 696.
58 Budrevie v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., 24 N. J. Misc. 24, 45 A. 2d 453
(C. P. 1946), appeal dismissed 135 N. J. L. 46, 50 A. 2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1946),
aff'd 136 N. J. L. 198, 55 A. 2d 10 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947); Hully v. Moos-
brugger, 88 N. J. L. 161, 95 A. 1007 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915); Savage v. Otis
Elevator Co., 136 N. J. L. 419, 56 A. 2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
59 Supra n. 4.
60 Supra n. 2.
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and foreseeability. 61 California remains the most conservative
forum, compensating only the innocent victim.62  The Ohio
rule,6 3 however, is in accord with the general rule, holding that
playful, sportive acts of employees are reasonably to be expected
from the association of men in common work. Where the em-
ployment through the environment has a causal connection with
an injury to an employee, suffered in the course of employment,
he is entitled to compensation. Though the leading Ohio decision
requires the employee to be actually engaged in his work, this
case compensated the instigator of horseplay, and rejected the
aggressor defense.
History
Is the modern doctrine of horseplay just? Should the sky-
larking, trouble-making employee profit from his wrongs? The
early legal attitude towards horseplay followed the English
cases which denied compensation to the innocent or non-
participating victims of horseplay.6 4 English courts had reasoned
that injuries sustained by a servant while engaged in the actual
work assigned to him did not arise out of the employment if due
to the acts of fellow servants who were themselves outside the
course of employment. Acts causing injury by a fellow servant,
done through spite, malice, or a spirit of fun, or in the act of
"larking," did not arise out of the employment. This was the
widely held American view until the now famous decision of
Leonbruno v. Chamberlain Mill. Some courts attempted to
avoid the general rule of non-liability for skylarking by finding
exceptions where the employer had notice, or where the custom
of horseplay existed. 65 Judge Cardozo's pronouncements in the
Leonbruno case,66 while liberalizing the horseplay concept, also
accounts for the refraction of the doctrine into rules of com-
pensation differing when the claimant is victim, participant, or
instigator. Cardozo recognized that risk of injury in the factory
was not an element measured by the tendency of an act to serve
61 Piatek v. Plymouth Rock Provision Co., supra n. 1.
62 Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'r., 26 Cal. 2d 286, 158
P. 2d 9 (1945).
63 East Ohio Gas Co. v. Coe, 42 Ohio App. 334, 182 N.E. 123 (1932).
64 Armitage v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co. (1902) 2 K. B. 796.
65 Markell v. Daniel Green Felt Shoe Co., supra n. 4; Hazelwood v. Stand-
ard Sanitary Mfg. Co., supra n. 3.
66 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E. 711 (1920).
Jan., 1966
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the master's business. Furthermore, liability, he believed, was
not contingent on fault of the master or his representatives. 7
Cardozo discarded the agency and master-servant doctrine, for
the broader "course of employment" base. The innocent victim
recovered "because he was in a factory in touch with associa-
tions and conditions, inseparable from factory life. The risks of
such associations and conditions were risks of the employ-
ment." 68
Since Cardozo's opinion, courts have sought to compensate
only the innocent victim.69 In speculating on the cause of this
result Horovitz has said that Cardozo, seeking to make a new
rule, followed the custom of "throwing a bone" to the losing em-
ployer, thereby advancing change cautiously.70 Subsequently,
the aggressor was denied recovery, so that he could not profit
from his wrong.71 Cardozo's felicity, in the words of Frankfurter
"led to lazy repetition," 72 so that a legal formula for the decision
of horseplay cases was quickly established. Refusal of compen-
sation where the claimant was an instigator was reinforced by
reasoning indicative of the common law precept that one must
not profit from his own wrong. The employee was not perform-
ing a duty of the employment; 73 he was not hired to start trou-
ble;7 4 he was not advancing any interest of the employer;75 he
was acting for his own wrongful purposes;7 6 he had abandoned
the employment. 77 Horovitz has characterized the numerous
methods of sustaining the aggressor defenses as two: (a) silence
on the issue, or (b) metaphysics and hairline distinctions.78
Following the Leonbruno case the innocent victim of horse-
play usually found relief in state and federal courts. This new
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Horovitz, supra n. 32.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Tiller v. Atlantic Coastline R.R., 63 S. Ct. 470, 87 L. Ed. 608 (1943).
73 Stillwagon v. Callan Bros., Inc., 183 App. Div. 114, 170 N. Y. S. 677 (1918).
74 Ibid.
75 Marion County Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 292 Ill. 463, 127 N. E. 84, 85
(1920).
76 Ibid.
7 Armour and Co. v. Industrial Comm., 397 fll. 433, 74 N. E. 2d 704, 706
(1947).
78 Horovitz, supra n. 32, at 359.
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view was clearly seen in the 1925 case of Kansas City Fibre Box
Co. v. Conne11. 79 In this case the court read the Workmen's
Compensation statute as intending to impose a duty of care on
the employer, so that he would prevent horseplay. The majority
rejected the view of the dissent which sought to deny the award
since the claimant had failed to show evidence of custom or
habit, or employer's knowledge. Furthermore, the claimant had
participated voluntarily, and the injury was a direct result of
the skylarking.
Where horseplay had ceased and a participant (although
not the instigator) was injured, he was not precluded from re-
covery.8 0 The horseplay doctrine had not yet freed itself from
the vocabulary of the common law. Later cases continued to
cite employer knowledge of horseplay. Knowledge of employee's
horseplaying tendencies and employer negligence in allowing
horseplay figured in attributing liability.8 ' Though courts held
that a participant or instigator could not recover, the claimant
who could show that he had been forced to participate received
compensation. Judges made more categories in a seeming effort
to extend compensation. A strong tendency to avoid the aggres-
sor defense could be seen in numerous decisions which found
ways to compensate instigators and participants in horseplay.
8 2
The common law concepts of custom and foreseeability,
previously mentioned, were also aids in overcoming the aggres-
sor defense.83 More importantly, the aggressor in assault cases
was being compensated where it was found that the assault was
79 Kansas City Fibre Box Co. v. Connell, 5 F. 2d 398 (8th Cir. 1925).
80 Miller's Indemnity Underwriters Co. v. Heller, 253 S. W. 853 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1913); Industrial Comm. of Ohio v. Wolgandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N. E.
38 (1921); Myott v. Vermont Plywood, Inc., 110 Vt. 131, 2 A. 2d 204 (1938);
Cassel v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., supra n. 3; Badger
Furniture Co. v. Industrial Comm., 195 Wis. 134, 217 N. W. 734 (1928).
81 Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Board of Illinois, 277 Ill. 53, 115 N. E.
128 (1917); Payne v. Industrial Comm., 295 Ill. 388, 129 N. E. 122 (1920);
Kokomo Steel and Wire Co. v. Irick, 80 Ind. App. 610, 141 N. E. 796 (1923);
Lee's Case, 109 Conn. 413, 134 N. E. 268 (1922); Stewart v. Kansas City,
102 Kans. 307, 171 P. 413 (1919). Glenn v. Reynolds Spring Co., 235 Mich.
693, 96 N. W. 617 (1924). Anderson v. State Industrial Comm., 155 Okla.
34, 7 P. 2d 902 (1932).
82 Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry, supra n. 1; Chambers v. Union Oil Co.,
supra n. 4; Scheuller v. Armour and Co., 116 Pa. Super. 323, 176 A. 527
(1935); Stalginsky v. Waterbury Rolling Mills, 124 Conn. 355, 199 A. 653
(1938); Haas v. Brotherhood of Transportation Workers, 158 Pa. Super.
291, 44 A. 2d 776 (1938); Dillon's Case, 324 Mass. 102, 85 N. E. 2d 69 (1949).
83 Dillon's Case, supra n. 82.
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work-connected. 4 Later, the distinction became unreal. In the
case of Verschleiser v. Joseph Stern and Son, Inc.,8 5 the court
attempted to sidestep hairpin distinctions and said that regard-
less of provocation the injury was the result of horseplay en-
gendered by employees in the course of employment on the
premises of the employer.8 Since horseplay did not entail
serious wilful misconduct there was no need to differentiate it
from ordinary assault.
Conclusion
The doctrine of horseplay has been a troublesome and ana-
chronistic rule retaining common law principles which in reality
are foreign to Workmen's Compensation concepts. The develop-
ment of this doctrine into a modern view of working conditions,
taking into account the normal tendencies of human nature, has
spanned the first half of the Twentieth Century. This change has
been made by the courts, not by the legislatures, and though it is
not fully accepted, the present majority rule does not differen-
tiate between instigator, victim, or participant. Abandonment of
employment is more important than personal fault. While the
"in the course of" test has been criticized, because the role of
substantial deviation may cause the courts to flounder in a sea
of subtle distinctions, this alternative of using "arising out of"
has been demonstrating the dangers of reliance on causation
tests. A possible solution to the problem caused by the words
"arising out of" is their deletion by legislative action, thus im-
posing absolute liability on the employer for all injuries related
to the incidents of the employment. Whether or not such an an-
swer is posed, a final diagnosis indicates that at the present time
the majority of courts show a healthy attitude-regarding con-
cepts of fault, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and
foreseeability. The courts choose not to penalize the employee
for indulging in "harmless pranks," which end in injury to him-
self or to others.
84 Ibid.
85 229 N.Y. 192, 128 N.E. 126 (1920).
86 Ibid.
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